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November 16, 2016 
Cooperative organizations (this includes clubs and 
professional partnerships) play an important role in 
the economy, often bridging the gap that exists be-
tween the purely public and the purely private in the 
provision of goods. This has been particularly true in 
agriculture, where cooperative organizations have 
emerged to deal primarily with market failures such 
as oligopsonistic pricing. 
The collective nature of cooperative organizations 
creates two key property rights issues: the free rider 
problem and the horizon problem. In agricultural 
cooperatives free rider problems emerge in raising 
investment funds at formation and later for growth 
and expansion during operation; in both cases, 
members prefer to let others make the investment 
but to nevertheless have access to the benefits of the 
investment.  
Horizon problems in agricultural cooperatives po-
tentially arise when the period of time over which 
members have a claim on the benefits of an invest-
ment is less than the length of time over which the 
benefits are generated. The result of this horizon 
mismatch may be underinvestment in assets or in-
vestments in assets that generate short-run benefits 
and not the long-run benefits necessary to keep the 
cooperative efficient and viable.  
Of course, the lower investment may also be a reflec-
tion of the free rider problem that was discussed 
above, making it difficult to identify the precise 
cause of underinvestment. This is particularly 
the case because, as shown by our research, the 
two problems are linked and interact in im-
portant ways. For instance, free riding under de-
creasing returns to size reduces the returns to coop- 
Market Reports  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  11-11-16 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  135.00  97.40  103.10 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  213.52  126.96  137.86 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  183.32  132.73  128.01 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  218.53  182.43  185.47 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  53.26  47.14  40.83 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75.49  72.41  73.82 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  155.62  150.90  142.05 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  360.61  356.94  352.40 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.94  2.81  2.66 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.39  3.08  2.94 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.06  8.95  8.91 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.66  4.80  4.50 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.57  2.65  2.85 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  185.00  160.00  145.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75.00  68.75  67.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  77.50  67.50  65.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  125.25  109.00  107.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51.13  41.00  41.75 
 ⃰ No Market          
erative investment, thus further exacerbating the horizon 
problem. And reducing the horizon of cooperative invest-
ments to make them more attractive to individuals with 
shorter time horizons leads to increased incentives for free 
riding.  
Research published in the latest issue of the Journal of Agri-
cultural & Resource Economics examines the impact of the 
horizon and free-rider problems on investment and patron-
age decisions and, in turn, on cooperative membership and 
member welfare. Capturing the interaction of these two 
property rights problems is critical in identifying the factors 
affecting individual decisions and welfare, and the condi-
tions under which cooperative investments are undertaken 
when the potential for horizon and free-rider problems is 
present. A full understanding of the linkage between these 
two property right problems is also crucial for determining 
policies and strategies that can be used to address them. 
The study offers new insights on the horizon and free-rider 
problems in cooperative organizations. Specifically, the 
study reveals that (i) the horizon problem need not neces-
sarily lead to short-term cooperative investments, (ii) free 
riding is not necessarily a problem for cooperative organiza-
tions, (iii) the source of the horizon problem, namely differ-
ent member time horizons, can help cope with the free-
rider problem, (iv) a properly designed membership fee can 
address the free rider and horizon problems, and (v) the 
optimal membership fee depends on the cooperative’s cost 
structure.  
Our analysis shows that although individuals differ in their 
valuation of the perceived benefits from forming or patron-
izing the cooperative because of factors such as age, these 
differences in valuations also create an opportunity to cope 
with the free rider problem. Specifically, a member’s time 
horizon determines whether that individual is part of a criti-
cal mass that must invest in the cooperative for it to begin 
operation. The study shows that this critical mass of mem-
bers is made up of people with longer time horizons. As a 
consequence, at least part of the membership is provided 
with an incentive to cooperate precisely because of the exist-
ence of differences in members’ time horizons. 
While this critical mass of members will cooperate and in-
vest in the cooperative under the right circumstances, the 
other members will find it optimal to free ride. If the coop-
erative exhibits decreasing returns, then free riding is detri-
mental to all members. One way of reducing the free rider 
problem is through the use of membership fees to members 
that are not part of the original critical mass. By equating 
the returns from investing in and patronizing the coopera-
tive with those from patronizing alone, a properly designed 
membership fee eliminates the incentive to free ride and 
raises the benefits generated by the cooperative under de-
creasing returns to size. 
Free riders, however, need not be bad for the organiza-
tion and the original members. For instance, if the co-
operative exhibits increasing returns to size, then free 
riding can benefit all members by lowering costs and 
creating greater benefits. Thus, allowing different mem-
bers to pay different amounts to join the cooperative 
organization can be advantageous. 
In addition to providing insights into the membership 
fee structure of cooperative organizations, our research 
shows that the impact of the horizon problem may 
differ from what is typically expected. While it is usual-
ly argued that the limited horizons of its members will 
lead to a cooperative undertaking projects that generate 
short-term rather than long-term projects, our study 
shows that this need not always be the case. The reason 
is that the individuals who decide to patronize and fi-
nance the cooperative are likely to have relatively long-
er horizons, with the result that the short-sightedness 
of the cooperative is attenuated to some degree. This 
result may be one reason why some cooperatives have 
been able to make long-term investments and, thus, 
remain competitive over time. 
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